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Abstract
We use a large panel dataset covering the years 1988 to 2010 to estimate
county specific total wage elasticities of labor demand for four highly aggregated
industries in the United States. Our industries are construction, finance/real es-
tate/service, manufacturing, and retail trade, which together employ on average
over eighty percent of the U.S. national labor force per year. We use both the
conventional constant coefficient panel data model and a random coefficients
panel data model to estimate labor demand elasticities in various industries.
We find the labor demand curves in all the industries studied to be downward
sloping. We also find significant evidence that the total wage elasticity of la-
bor demand exhibits regional variation. The labor demand estimates obtained
in this study are useful to investigate the differential impact of various shocks
and policy changes on the labor market. As an example, we use the estimated
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2county specific labor demand elasticities to identify the impact of union mem-
bership and right to work laws on labor demand. We show that labor demand
tends to become less elastic with higher union membership rates. We also find
that labor demand becomes more elastic if a right to work law is in place.
Keywords: Labor Demand Elasticity, Random Parameter Model, Union
Membership, Right to Work Law
JEL classification: C35, J20, J23, R14, R15, R21, R41
1 Introduction
The estimation of wage elasticities of labor demand has attracted significant atten-
tion in empirical labor economics. Hamermesh (1993) provides an exhaustive review
of the early research that has been done in this area. According to Hamermesh (1993),
the absolute value of the constant-output wage elasticity of labor demand for homo-
geneous labor in the U.S. is between 0.15 and 0.75, with 0.30 being an approximate
mean; the absolute value of the estimates for the total wage elasticity of labor demand
vary between 0.12 and 1.92. Homogeneous labor implies that we cannot distinguish
workers based on their skill level.
Fuchs et al. (1998) survey sixty five labor economists and confirm Hamermesh’s
findings. They report mean absolute values for constant-output and total wage elas-
ticity of labor demand equal to 0.42 and 0.63, respectively. More recently, Slaughter
(2001), using the NBER productivity database, estimates absolute values of the total
wage elasticity of labor demand for the manufacturing sector in the U.S. in the range
of 0.24 to 0.70. Hasan et al. (2007), using small industry panel data, estimate the
absolute value of the total wage elasticity of labor demand in India’s manufacturing
3sector to be around 0.40. In Table 1 we provide a list of studies that estimate total
wage elasticities of labor demand from a variety of different data sets.
Most studies cited in Table 1 estimate wage elasticities of labor demand for one
sector or industry, in particular the manufacturing sector, and assume no regional
variation in the wage elasticity of labor demand. While regional variation in the
labor demand elasticity may be safely neglected for smaller countries such as New
Zealand, for a large country, such as the United States, this may not be a reasonable
assumption. In the U.S., for example, history, geography, and politics vary consid-
erably across counties, and all these factors are likely to induce regional variation in
the wage elasticity of labor demand. Using the County Business Patterns (CBP), we
address the issues of regional and industry heterogeneity for labor demand estimates.
In particular, we estimate county specific labor demand elasticities for multiple indus-
tries located in the U.S. This makes our study unique in the empirical labor demand
literature.
Our use of a single data source makes comparing elasticities across industries easier
than comparing elasticities from different studies that vary in methodology and data.
Our elasticity estimates can therefore be used to calibrate local labor markets that
may be part of larger regional economic models. These models can be used, for
example, to study how external shocks might have asymmetric effects on different
local labor markets based in part on variations in their labor demand elasticities.
To obtain county specific total wage elasticities of labor demand we follow a two-
step procedure. In step-one, we specify a canonical log linear labor demand function.
Then we use the traditional first-difference panel data estimator to get the following
estimates for the absolute values of industry specific total wage elasticities of labor
demand: 0.32 for construction, 0.11 for finance-insurance-real estate-service, 0.23
4for manufacturing, and 0.23 for retail. Our industry specific total labor demand
elasticities fall within the range mentioned in Hamermesh (1993).
In step-two, we assume that the total wage elasticity of labor demand for an
industry is not a constant but a random variable, distributed log-normally in the
population of counties with unknown parameters. The log-normal distribution ensures
that the absolute value of the labor demand elasticity is always positive. We then
estimate the parameters of the log normal distribution by the method of maximum
simulated likelihood.
The means and standard deviations of the log-normal distribution for the four in-
dustries are as follows: (0.08, 0.01) for construction, (0.34, 3.26) for finance-insurance-
real estate-service, (0.38, 3.97) for manufacturing, and (0.35, 0.98) for retail trade. For
all four industries, the variance parameter is statistically significant, which suggests
the presence of regional variation in the total labor demand elasticity. In addition, the
means of the labor demand elasticity distributions all fall within the range mentioned
in the literature. Our results are also in line with evidence by Revelt and Train (1998)
that treating a parameter as a random variable usually increases its mean estimate;
this can be seen by comparing the elasticity estimates from step one and step two.
An exception is the construction sector.
Once we have information regarding the distributions of the wage elasticities of
labor demand, it is possible to get elasticity estimates for each county. Using these
estimates we find evidence of a negative relationship between the total wage elasticity
of labor demand and the incidence of union membership among workers. This result
makes intuitive sense since unions probably make firms less flexible in hiring and
firing workers thereby driving down labor demand elasticities. We also find that
the presence of a right to work law makes labor demand more elastic. This is also
5consistent with intuition since a right to work law will reduce the influence of unions at
the workplace and firms will become more flexible in their hiring and firing decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss briefly the theory behind
the labor demand function. In section 3 we describe the dataset. In sections 4 and 5
we present the results from the linear and random parameter panel data models . In
section 6 we explain how we obtain county specific labor demand elasticity estimates.
In section 7 we discuss the relationship between labor demand elasticity and union
membership. Finally, in section 8 we conclude by pointing to some applications and
possible extensions of our work.
2 Theory
Following Hamermesh (1993), the total industry labor demand elasticity (η′LL )
can be written as,
δ lnL (w, Y )
δ lnw
= η′LL = − [1− sL]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitution effect
− sLηD︸ ︷︷ ︸
scale effect
(1)
where, sL is the share of labor in total revenue, σ is the elasticity of substitution, and
ηD is the own-price elasticity of demand for the industry, L is the quantity of labor
demanded, w is the wage rate, and Y is output.
The first part of the total labor demand elasticity can be interpreted as the
constant-output labor demand elasticity, or the “substitution effect”. As the price
of labor rises, firms substitute away from labor in favor of other inputs. The sub-
stitution effect captures this adjustment on the profit maximizing firm’s part. The
higher the substitutability of labor with respect to other factors of production, the
larger is the constant-output labor demand elasticity. The second term captures the
6“scale effect”. As the cost of hiring labor rises, output price increases, which in turn
lowers the demand for the industry’s output, and hence lowers the industry’s labor
demand. Hence, the total labor demand elasticity can be viewed as the weighted
average of the constant-output labor demand elasticity and the own-price product
demand elasticity.
As Hamermesh (1993), Slaughter (2001), and Hasan et al. (2007) point out,
the choice of Y will determine whether we are estimating the constant output labor
demand elasticity or the total own price labor demand elasticity. If the measure of
output embodies the overall industry demand conditions, then we will be estimating
the total labor demand elasticity.
3 Data
We use the County Business Patterns (CBP) data set to get data from 1988 to
2010 on the number of establishments, total mid-March employees, and total first
quarter payroll by industry for counties in the conterminous U.S. In our dataset an
observation refers to an industry-county-year combination.
According to the Census Bureau, in the CBP, “An establishment is a single phys-
ical location at which business is conducted or services or industrial operations are
performed.” An establishment is different from a company or enterprise in that a
company might control multiple establishments. A company is controlled by a single
organization. In the CBP, the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system was
used to categorize establishments by their primary activity for the period leading
up to 1997. From 1998 onwards, the CBP switched to the North American Indus-
try Classification System (NAICS). Even between 1998 and 2010 there were periodic
changes made to the NAICS.
7In the CBP, data are available at various industry aggregation levels. For this
study, we use the 2-digit SIC and 2-digit NAICS industries to create four major
industry groups: construction, finance-insurance-real estate-service, manufacturing,
and retail. These four industries account on average for 87% of annual total employ-
ment in the sample. Table 2 provides our industry aggregation scheme.
Even at the 2-digit industry classification level the census bureau suppresses data
for confidentiality reasons. In such cases the census bureau provides an interval for the
industry employment level but sets payroll data equal to zero. Such data suppression
causes an average annual loss of 1% of total workers in the sample spread across the
different industries. Because of this small size we choose to drop observations subject
to data suppression.
We calculate the industry wage rate by dividing first quarter payroll by the total
number of mid-March employees1. The exact formula is shown below. In our notation
i, c, t denote industry, county and year, respectively, and s indexes the state in which
the county is located,
wict =
(
CPI2010
CPIt
× Total F irst Quarter Payrollict
Employeesict
)
÷ 480 (2)
where the division by 480 indicates that we assume that an average worker is employed
for 480 hours during the first quarter, and CPI is the consumer price index series
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
We obtain state level industry GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
We assume that a county’s share in a state’s industry GDP (SGDP) is proportional
to the county’s share in the total number of industry establishments located in that
state. Using this assumption, we impute county industry GDP, which gives us a
measure of industry demand conditions. The exact formula is shown below,
1Slaughter (2001) also follows the same procedure.
8Yict =
PPI2010
PPIt
× Establishmentsict∑
c
Establishmentsict
×Gross State Productist
 (3)
where PPI is the producer price index obtained from the BLS.
In our sample the count of workers from all industries increased from 86,791,257
in 1988 to 108,831,971 in 2010, a growth of approximately 25%. In 1988, the dis-
tribution of workers among the different sectors was given as follows: construction
5%, finance-insurance-real estate-service 36%, manufacturing 22%, retail 21%, and
others 16%. In the next 23 years the employment levels in the construction, finance-
insurance-real estate-service, and retail sectors registered growth rates of 8%, 69%,
and 47% respectively. The manufacturing sector during the same period experi-
enced a fall in employment of around 46%. This means that in 2010 the distribution
of workers among the different sectors was: construction 5%, finance-insurance-real
estate-service 47%, manufacturing 9%, retail 25%, and others 13%. In other words, in
the 23 year period the finance-insurance-real estate-service and retail sectors increased
their share in total employment mainly at the expense of the manufacturing sector.
During the same time period, real output of the construction, finance-insurance-real
estate-service, manufacturing, and retail sectors grew by 27%, 133%, 2%, and 80%,
respectively. This implies that even though the manufacturing sector lost workers,
the remaining workers became more productive. Figures 8 and 8 present yearly values
of total national employment and total national real output for the four industries.
The real wage rate ($/hour) in 1988 in the construction, finance-insurance-real
estate-service, manufacturing, and retail sectors was 13.78, 11.85, 18.03, and 8.32,
respectively. In 2010, the real wage rate in the construction, finance-insurance-real
estate-service, manufacturing, and retail sectors increased to 15.72, 15, 19.87, and
8.60, respectively. This means that the real wage rate across the construction, finance-
insurance-real estate-service, manufacturing, and retail sectors had growth rates of
914%, 26%, 10%, and 3%, respectively. Figure 3 shows yearly values of the real wage
rate.
Table 3 presents some more descriptive statistics for the data at the county level.
It reveals that on average the finance-insurance-real estate-service sector dominates
county employment followed by the retail and manufacturing sectors. The construc-
tion sector employs on average the least number of workers in a county. Table 3 also
shows that on average the wage rate is highest in the manufacturing sector and lowest
in the retail sector. In fact, the retail wage rate is pretty close to the U.S. federal
nominal minimum wage rate of $7.25.
Because of data suppression and natural changes in the employment distribution
across counties we end up with an unbalanced panel data set. The construction,
finance-insurance-real estate-service, manufacturing, and retail sectors are present
in 3075, 3099, 2952, and 3106 distinct counties, respectively. However, only 2037,
2889, 1839, and 2857 counties appear every year in our dataset for the construction,
finance-insurance-real estate-service, manufacturing, and retail sectors. The remain-
ing counties appear infrequently.
4 Constant Parameter Panel Data Model
We denote industry, county and year by i, c, t , respectively, and s indexes the
state in which the county is located. We specify the labor demand function following
Hamermesh (1993), Slaughter (2001), and Hasan et al. (2007), as
ln (Lict) = β0is(c)t + β1i ln (wict) + β2i ln (Y ict) + ϑic + εict (4)
10
where L is employment, w the real wage rate, Y real output, ϑ a time invariant
industry specific county fixed effects, and ε is the error term. β0is(c)t is a constant
that varies by state and year. In the above specification β1i gives the industry specific
total wage elasticity of labor demand.
From a purely statistical viewpoint identification of the parameters in equation (4)
requires that ln(wict) and ln(Yict) be uncorrelated with ϑic and εict. If this condition
fails, we can still identify the parameters by first differencing equation 4 which gets
rid of the time invariant county fixed effects. The first differenced version of the
labor demand function is given in 5. Now, as long as ∆ ln(wict) and ∆ ln(Yict) are
uncorrelated with ∆εict , we can use the OLS estimator to estimate the parameters
∆β0is(c)t, β1i, and β2i . First differencing also implies that the term ∆εict is less likely
to be serially correlated. Note that, by using 5 we cannot estimate the state specific
trends, but only the change in the trends,
4 ln (Lict) = 4β0is(c)t + β1i4 ln (wict) + β2i4 ln (Y ict) +4εict (5)
In economic terms, to claim that β1i measures the total wage elasticity of labor
demand we are in fact assuming that market labor supply is perfectly elastic. If
this is not the case, then our model will suffer from simultaneity bias since market
outcomes are determined by both demand and supply. We believe that a perfectly
elastic labor supply is a reasonable assumption given that our unit of observation is
an industry at the county level. Slaughter (2001) makes the same assumption in his
time series study of 4-digit SIC national manufacturing industries. Slaughter (2001)
argues that his industries are disaggregated enough to support his assumption, and
points to the fact that almost all the studies cited in Hamermesh (1993) make a similar
assumption regarding labor supply. Figure 8 presents our assumption regarding labor
supply graphically.
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In the labor demand equation, β0is(c)t captures the combined state level effects
which may drive labor demand in the counties located in that state. For example,
among other things, β0is(c)t may include state level labor market regulations. More-
over, by allowing the state level constant to vary over time, we can capture changes
in such labor market regulations.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4, where we present models with and
without β0is(c)t . We report cluster robust standard errors, where clustering is done
at the state level to account for possible correlation of employment across counties
within a state (Dube et al., 2010). Based Table 4, the absolute values of the estimates
of the total wage elasticity of labor demand for our four industries fall in the interval
0.11-0.32. This is consistent with the estimates presented in Hamermesh (1993). As
specification 2 shows in Table 4, the wage elasticity of labor demand does not change
much when we drop β0is(c)t from the labor demand equation but, as expected, the
R2 drops significantly. In both specifications we see that the construction sector has
the highest labor demand elasticity, followed by manufacturing and retail trade. The
finance-insurance-real estate-service sector has the lowest labor demand elasticity.
The coefficient for real output is positive and less than one across industries and
specifications. We infer from Table 4 that the retail sector is the most sensitive to
changes in output followed by the construction, finance-insurance-real estate-service,
and manufacturing sectors.
5 Random Parameter Panel Data Model
In the labor demand equation presented in the previous section the coefficient of
log wage, β1i, is a constant. This means that there is no variation in the wage elasticity
of labor demand across counties and/or over time. In the constant parameter linear
12
panel data framework discussed earlier we cannot estimate a β1i for each county-year
combination, since then, the number of parameters to estimate will be greater than
the number of observations in the data. To incorporate regional variation in the wage
elasticity of labor demand across counties, we can estimate a β1i for each county. The
problem with this approach is that there is no guarantee that all the β1i s’ will have
the correct sign.
An alternative approach to incorporate heterogeneity in the wage elasticity of
labor demand across counties would be to interact ln(wict) with some variable which
we believe affects the wage elasticity of labor demand and which itself varies across
counties. However, there are two drawbacks with this approach. One, since multiple
factors may influence the wage elasticity of labor demand, the result will crucially
depend on the choice of the interaction variables. Two, theory provides little guidance
on the choice of the interaction variables.
We believe that a more robust approach is to assume that the parameter β1i is a
random variable. Under this approach, we cannot estimate β1i , but we can estimate
the parameters which describe the distribution of β1i in the population of counties. In
this paper, we assume for simplicity that β1i varies over counties but not over time2.
In equation 6, the log linear labor demand equation now includes β1ic to incorporate
heterogeneity in the wage elasticity of labor demand at the county level. We assume
that β2i is a constant.
ln (Lict) = β0i − β1ic ln (wict) + β2i ln (Y ict) + ϑic + εict (6)
As Table 4 shows, the results from the constant parameter linear panel data
models are not greatly different with or without the inclusion of the state-year dummy
2To incorporate time variation in the wage elasticity of labor demand we could split the data
into different time periods and estimate separate models for each time period.
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interaction variables. Therefore, to simplify our estimation, we choose the log linear
labor demand function without the state-year dummy interaction variables.
Again, first differencing removes the county fixed effects and yields the following
equation,
4 ln (Lict) = −β1ic4 ln (wict) + β2i4 ln (Y ict) +4εict (7)
We assume that the distribution of ∆εict conditional on β1ic , ∆ ln(wict) and
∆ ln(Yict) is i.i.d N(0, σ2(εi)) . If the independence assumption for the error terms
fails, our estimator is still consistent. However, the standard errors would need to be
adjusted for serial correlation.
We assume that β1ic is distributed i.i.d ln (N [β1i, exp (γi)]) in the population of
counties, where β1ic and exp(γi) are the mean and variance of β1ic ’s natural logarithm.
The log normal distribution assures that β1ic is always positive. Note also that exp(γi)
guarantees a positive value for the shape parameter of the log-normal distribution.
The mean and variance of β1ic are given by the following formulas,
β¯1i = E [β1ic] = exp
[
β1i +
exp (γi)
2
]
(8)
σ2β1i = V ar (β1ic) = [exp (exp (γi))− 1] exp [2β1i + exp (γi)] (9)
The log-likelihood function for the model is presented in Equation 10
lnL (θi) =
∑
c
∑
t
ln
 +∞ˆ
0
φ (4εict (β1ic))φLn (β1ic) dβ1ic
 (10)
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where θi is the vector of parameters we estimate, φ is a normal density function with
mean zero and variance σ2(εi) , and φLn is a log-normal distribution with mean β1i and
variance exp(γi).
The log-likelihood function in equation 10 is evaluated by simulation since the
integral in the log-likelihood function cannot be computed analytically. The simula-
tion is performed as follows. Given θi , we draw a value for β1ic from the log-normal
distribution. The draws of β1ic are independent across counties. We then compute
the normal density φict for that draw. We repeat this process R times and find the
average φict . The simulated log-likelihood function is,
ln SLL(θi) =
∑
c
∑
t
(
1
R
∑
r
φictr
)
(11)
where r indexes a draw from the log-normal distribution.
The simulated maximum likelihood estimator is the vector of parameters θˆi that
maximize the SLL function. To reduce our computational burden we set the values for
β2i and σ2(εi) at those obtained from the linear panel data result presented in Table 4,
where σ2(εi) takes the value equal to the variance of the first difference residuals. Given
that the number of draws (R ) increases faster than
√
N (the number of cross sectional
units), the simulated maximum likelihood estimator retains all the properties of the
traditional maximum likelihood estimator (Train, 2009). We use a sample of 1000
random draws for each county to simulate the log likelihood function. We then use
the ‘Nelder-Mead’ algorithm to maximize the simulated log likelihood function3. The
simulated maximum likelihood estimates are presented in Table 5.
Comparing Tables 4 and 5 we find that for all the industries except construction
the random parameter model yields a higher value for the average wage elasticity of
3The ‘Nelder-Mead’ technique is a search algorithm which does not require computations of
derivatives. Given the size of our dataset and the need for simulation in computing the integral, we
choose the ‘Nelder-Mead’ algorithm over other commonly used algorithms.
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labor demand than the estimates from the linear panel data model. Our finding is
consistent with Revelt and Train (1998), who conclude that the mean coefficients in
a mixed logit model are consistently bigger than that the fixed coefficients from a
standard logit model. This happens because the random parameter model explains
some of the variation in the unobserved component of the linear panel data model
which arises due to the randomness of the parameter.
Table 5 also shows statistically significant spatial variation in the labor demand
elasticity. The manufacturing sector has the highest spatial variation, followed by
finance-insurance-real estate-service, retail trade, and construction sectors.
6 County Specific Labor Demand Elasticity
In the previous section we presented estimates of the mean and standard deviation
of the log normal distributions which describe the wage elasticity of labor demand
for four different industries in the U.S. From these estimates we can calculate, for
example, for every industry the proportion of counties which have a wage elasticity of
labor demand greater than one. However, we can do better and estimate an average
wage elasticity of labor demand for each county. We describe this procedure below
based on Train (2009).
Consider Equation 12,
φˆLn (β1ic|4εict)× f (4εict) = φ (4εict|β1ic)× φLn (β1ic) , (12)
which states that the joint density of β1ic and 4εict can be written as the product
of the probability of 4εict and the probability of β1ic conditional on 4εict (left-hand
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side), or with the other direction of conditioning, as the product of the probability of
β1ic and the probability of 4εict conditional on β1ic (right-hand side).
Rearranging equation 12 we get,
φˆLn (β1ic|4εict) =
φ (4εict|β1ic)× φLn (β1ic)
f (4εict) (13)
Note that the conditional probability of β1ic will vary over the years because 4εict
changes from year to year. This implies that we can get β¯1ict, the average wage
elasticity of labor demand for industry i located in county c at year t, using equation
14.
β¯1ict =
ˆ
β1icφˆLn (β1ic;4εict) dβ1ic, (14)
which can be rewritten as
β¯1ict =
ˆ
β1ic
φ (4εict; β1ic)× φLn (β1ic)
f (4εict) dβ1ic (15)
The simulated counterpart of β¯1ict is ˇ¯β1ict which is described by the formula given
in equation 16,
ˇ¯β1ict =
∑
r
wrβr (16)
where
wr =
φ (4εict; β1ic)∑
r
φ (4εict; βr1ic)
. (17)
Since we assume a time invariant wage elasticity of labor demand, we modify
equations 16 and 17 to get ˇ¯β1ic as shown below.
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ˇ¯β1ic =
∑
t
∑
r
wr′βr (18)
wr′ =
φ (4εict; βr1ic)∑
t
∑
r
φ (4εict; βr1ic)
(19)
We map the county specific total wage elasticity of labor demand for each industry
using ArcGIS© (Figures 8, 8, 8 and 8). As the color in the maps changes from yellow
to red, it indicates an increasing wage elasticity of labor demand. The white spots in
the map are counties for which we have no estimates available.
7 Effect of Union Membership on County Specific
Labor Demand Elasticity
In section 5 we mentioned that various factors might induce variation in the wage
elasticity of labor demand across counties in the U.S. One such factor might be the
incidence of union membership among workers. Intuitively, unions should make firms
less flexible in hiring and firing workers in response to wage changes, and, therefore,
should exert a negative impact on the absolute value of the total wage elasticity
of labor demand. In other words, if there is a significant presence of unions in a
state, then following an increase in employment the firms might not be able to reduce
employment as much as in a state with lower union presence.
We use an alternative measure of union power by introducing a dummy variable
measuring whether a state has implemented a right to work law. If a union is certified
at a place of work, then an employee might be required to join the union or pay
membership dues. This practice deals with the free rider problem where a worker does
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not pay the cost of negotiation (membership fee, wage loss during the negotiation
period if a strike is called), but enjoys the benefits made possible by negotiations
between management and union. A right to work law removes the requirement of
being a union member in order to gain employment, or paying membership fees even
if the non union member worker will enjoy the benefits arising from the union’s
negotiations with the management. Hence, in a right to work law state, employers
will have more flexibility in changing their hiring pattern following a wage movement.
As a consequence we will expect the total elasticity of labor demand to be higher in
a county that belongs to a state that has the right to work law in place.
To test this hypothesis we obtain data for the years 2001 to 2010 on the percentage
of workers in a state belonging to unions from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We
average the union membership data for the ten year period for the lower 48 states
and the District of Columbia. The averages are shown in Table 6. According to
Table 6, over the ten year period, New York State had the highest average union
membership among workers at 26.26%, more than twice the overall average of 11% in
the conterminous U.S. during this period; North Carolina had the lowest at 4.26%.
We specify our model as follows:
ln
(
ˇ¯β1ic
)
=
K∑
k=1
γkXick + δ ln
(
Average Union Memberships(c)
)
+ξRight to Work Dummy + εic (20)
where average union membership gives us the extent of unionization in a state and
X is a set of controls (K) (average total county employment between 2001 to 2010,
industry dummy variables, urban dummy). In a different specification, instead of
including average union membership as the main independent variable of interest, we
include a dummy indicating whether the state has a right to work law in place or not.
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The right to work dummy variable has the value of 1 if the state where the county is
in has a right to work law in effect. Table 7 shows the right to work states and the
year when the statue was enacted and/or the constitution amended. We treat the
dummy for right to work having the value 0 for Indiana and Michigan as they became
right to work states in 2012. We then specify the model with both the average union
membership and right to work dummy included.
All the three models are then estimated with dummy variables for state included
in order to account for state fixed effects.
In Table 8 we present regression results where the dependent variable is the log of
the absolute value of the county wage elasticity of labor demand in an industry and the
independent variable(s) of interest is the log of average state level union membership
among workers and/or the right to work dummy. The regression sample pools across
all industries as can be seen from equation 20. In the regression equation, we include
average total county employment over the ten year period, and a dummy variable to
indicate if the county was designated rural or urban in the 2000 U.S. decennial census.
We also include industry fixed effects in the regression. In addition to these covariates,
specifications 4, 5, 6 in Table 8 include state fixed effects. Across all specifications
except specification 3 (with both average union membership and the right to work
dummy included, but state dummies excluded) we find that higher union membership
among workers in a state tends to lower the absolute value of the county wage elasticity
of labor demand. We find that raising union membership by 10% among workers will
reduce county wage elasticity of labor demand by 0.05% according to specification 1
(with average union membership included, but the right to work dummy and state
dummies excluded). In addition, we find that counties designated urban in the 2000
U.S. decennial census, usually have a lower wage elasticity of labor demand. Counties
which have more workers on average, tend to have a more elastic labor demand. In
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specification (3), where we have both average union membership and right to work
binary variable included in our model, but exclude state indicator variables, the effect
of union membership becomes positive but not statistically significant.
With the right to work dummy included in our model, we find that the absolute
value of the county specific total wage elasticity of labor demand will go up (or the
demand for labor will become more elastic) if the state, where a specific county is in,
has a right to work law in place. When we include only the right to work dummy
in our model and exclude average union membership and state dummy variables, as
in specification (2), we find that the total wage elasticity of labor demand is about
0.7% higher in counties belonging to states with a right to work law. When we
include only the average union membership variable but not state identifiers, as in
specification (3), we find that counties in states with right to work laws have about
a 1.1% higher labor demand elasticity. In specification (5), including just the state
dummy variables, but not the average union membership tells us that, if a county is
in a state with the right to work law in place, then it will have a 5.2% higher labor
demand elasticity. If we include average union membership, the right to work dummy,
and state indicator variables in our model (specification 6), we find that a 10% rise
in average union membership will lower the total wage elasticity of labor demand in
a county by 0.18%, and, if the state where the county is situated in has enacted a
right to work law, then it will increase the labor demand elasticity by 7.2%.
To summarize, we find in all the specifications except one (not statistically signif-
icant) that, with a higher extent of union membership, the county-specific total wage
elasticity of labor demand decreases. This implies that, as union penetration rises,
the total wage elasticity of labor demand becomes less elastic, or employers become
less flexible in their hiring and firing decisions. We find in all specifications that, if
a county belongs to a state that has enacted a right to work law, then the county-
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specific total wage elasticity of labor demand is higher in that county. In other words,
if union membership or payment of union membership dues are not mandatory, then
the total wage elasticity of labor demand will be higher, or employers will have more
flexibility in the hiring and firing decisions.
8 Conclusion
The main goal of this study is to provide a benchmark analysis for the estimation of
labor demand elasticities by classifying the United States labor market into different
industries. One advantage and rationale for pursuing this study is to be able to
investigate and comment on the effects of different external shocks and policy changes
on the elasticity of labor demand for different industries, without being restricted to
any particular industry or sector within an industry. We estimate the elasticity of
labor demand by dividing the entire United States economy into various industry
groups. Our unit of observation in this study becomes an industry-county pair in any
given year. Using the County Business Patterns (CBP) dataset for the years 1988 to
2010 we provide county4 specific estimates of the total wage elasticity of labor demand
for four industries: construction, finance-insurance-real estate-service, manufacturing,
and retail trade. Our estimates are based on a two-step procedure. In step one we
estimate linear, constant parameters, panel data models for each industry. Using
the results from step one, in step two we estimate again, for each industry, a linear
panel data model, but, where the total wage elasticity of labor demand parameter is
a random variable having a log normal distribution in the population of counties. We
find statistically significant evidence that the total wage elasticity of labor demand
exhibits spatial variation within each of the four aggregated industries.
42943 Counties located in the conterminous U.S.
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Our estimates of the county specific total wage elasticities of labor demand can be
utilized to investigate the effects of a policy shock, such as a minimum wage law, or of a
labor market feature, such as the extent of union membership on the elasticity of labor
demand. Our methodology enables us to compare not only the absolute changes in
the labor demand elasticity in an industry after a policy change or a change in a labor
market feature, but also the relative changes in the labor demand elasticity across
industries. We show this by analyzing the effect of union membership and the right
to work law on the labor demand elasticity. We find that higher union membership
makes the county-specific total wage elasticity of labor demand less elastic, and the
presence of a right to work law makes it more elastic.
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Table 1: Elasticity Measurements in the Literature
Study Description Data Time Period −η′LL
Nadiri (’68)
U.S. Manufacturing, K held constant
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1947-64 0.12
Messe (’80) U.S. private production-worker, KL
prices, K held constant
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1947-74 1.73
Layard & Nickell (’86)
U.K. Aggregate, K held constant
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1957-83 1.19
Aggregate, Annual, Time Series 1954-83 0.93
Andrews (’97) U.K. Aggregate, KLEM prices, K
held constant
Aggregate, Annual, Time Series 1950-79 0.51
Burgess (’88) U.K. Manufacturing, EM prices, K
held constant
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1964-82 1.85
Harris (’90) New Zealand private worker, K held
constant
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1965-87 0.24
Nickell & Symons (’90)
U.S. Manufacturing, K held constant
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1962-84 1.92
Symons & Layard (’84) OECD Manufacturing, LM prices, no
Y or K
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1956-80 1.54
Wadhwani (’87) U.K. Manufacturing, KLM prices, no
Y or K
Aggregate, Quarterly, Time Series 1962-81 0.38
Kennan (’88) U.S. Manufacturing
production-worker, no Y or K
Aggregate, Monthly, Time Series 1948-71 11.58
Begg et al. (’89)
U.K., import prices, no Y or K
Aggregate, Annual, Time Series 1953-85 0.40
Caruth & Oswald (’85) U.K.Coal Mining, KLE prices, no Y
or K
Small Industry, Annual, Time Series 1950-80 1.4
Wadhwani & Wall (’90) U.K. Manufacturing, ML prices, K
held constant
Firms, Panel Data 1974-82 0.53
Benjamin (’92)
Java Farm Labor, L held fixed
Farms, Cross Section 1980 0.30
Blanchflower et al. (’91)
U.K. plants, no Y or K
Plants, Cross Section 1984 0.93
Slaughter (’01) U.S. Manufacturing Non-production
Labor, no K
Aggregate, Annual, Time Series 1961-91 0.65
Hasan et al. (’07)
India Manufacturing, no K
Small Industry, Panel Data 1980-97 0.40
Notes: Source- Hamermesh (1993), authors
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
28
Ta
bl
e
4:
R
es
ul
ts
fr
om
C
on
st
an
t
P
ar
am
et
er
P
an
el
D
at
a
M
od
el
In
du
st
ry
β
1
i
β
2
i
R
2
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
4
lo
g
(w
a
g
e)
4
lo
g
(o
u
tp
u
t)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
-0
.3
2
-0
.2
9
0.
59
0.
58
0.
24
0.
16
59
61
5
[0
.0
2]
[0
.0
2]
[0
.0
3]
[0
.0
2]
(-
13
.4
6)
(-
12
.7
3)
(2
1.
75
)
(2
5.
86
)
F
in
./
In
s.
/R
ea
lE
st
./
Se
rv
ic
e
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
3
0.
48
0.
47
0.
36
0.
32
66
70
7
[0
.0
3]
[0
.0
3]
[0
.0
1]
[0
.0
1]
(-
3.
91
)
(-
4.
82
)
(3
2.
71
)
(3
2.
84
)
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
-0
.2
3
-0
.2
2
0.
42
0.
27
0.
16
0.
06
55
96
1
[0
.0
3]
[0
.0
3]
[0
.0
2]
[0
.0
2]
(-
7.
26
)
(-
7.
13
)
(1
9.
21
)
(1
1.
88
)
R
et
ai
lT
ra
de
-0
.2
3
-0
.2
0
0.
88
0.
69
0.
50
0.
37
66
94
5
[0
.0
4]
[0
.0
4]
[0
.0
2]
[0
.0
2]
(-
5.
68
)
(-
5.
06
)
(4
5.
08
)
(3
0.
07
)
St
at
e
D
um
m
y
×Y
ea
r
D
um
m
y
√
×
√
×
√
×
N
ot
es
:
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
e:
4
lo
g
(L
ic
t)
(1
):
In
cl
ud
es
st
at
e
du
m
m
y
an
d
ye
ar
du
m
m
y
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
(2
):
D
oe
sn
’t
in
cl
ud
e
st
at
e
du
m
m
y
an
d
ye
ar
du
m
m
y
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
C
lu
st
er
R
ob
us
t
St
an
da
rd
E
rr
or
s
in
br
ac
ke
ts
;T
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
C
lu
st
er
ID
is
St
at
e
29
Ta
bl
e
5:
R
es
ul
ts
fr
om
R
an
do
m
P
ar
am
et
er
P
an
el
D
at
a
M
od
el
In
du
st
ry
β
1
i
√ σ2 β
1
i
β
1
i
γ
i
β
2
i
σ
2 ε i
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
0.
08
0.
01
-2
.4
7
0.
48
0.
59
0.
04
(-
52
.9
8)
(3
0.
81
)
F
in
./
In
s.
/R
ea
lE
st
./
Se
rv
ic
e
0.
34
3.
26
-3
.3
4
0.
75
0.
48
0.
04
(-
38
.9
8)
(4
1.
76
)
M
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
0.
38
3.
97
-3
.3
2
0.
77
0.
42
0.
03
(-
40
.1
7)
(4
2.
53
)
R
et
ai
lT
ra
de
0.
35
0.
98
-2
.1
5
0.
39
0.
88
0.
01
(-
50
.7
9)
(2
7.
09
)
N
ot
es
:
β
1
ic
=
M
ea
n
of
lo
g
no
rm
al
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
fo
r
β
1
ic
=
ex
p
[ β 1i+
0.
5e
x
p
(γ
i)
2
]
√ σ2 β
1
i
=
St
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
lo
g
no
rm
al
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
fo
r
β
1
ic
=
ex
p
[ exp
(γ
i)
2
−
1] ex
p
[ 2β 1i
+
ex
p
(γ
i)
2
]
T
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
β
2
i
an
d
σ
2 ε i
ar
e
fix
ed
du
ri
ng
es
ti
m
at
io
n
30
Ta
bl
e
6:
Av
er
ag
e
U
ni
on
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
A
m
on
g
W
or
ke
rs
by
St
at
e
F
IP
S
St
at
e
St
at
e
N
am
e
M
ea
n
U
ni
on
M
br
sh
p
(%
)
F
IP
S
St
at
e
St
at
e
N
am
e
M
ea
n
U
ni
on
M
br
sh
p
(%
)
1
A
LA
B
A
M
A
10
.8
3
31
N
E
B
R
A
SK
A
10
.4
1
4
A
R
IZ
O
N
A
7.
83
32
N
E
V
A
D
A
16
.8
0
5
A
R
K
A
N
SA
S
6.
05
33
N
E
W
H
A
M
P
SH
IR
E
11
.6
3
6
C
A
LI
FO
R
N
IA
18
.1
3
34
N
E
W
JE
R
SE
Y
20
.0
0
8
C
O
LO
R
A
D
O
9.
15
35
N
E
W
M
E
X
IC
O
9.
96
9
C
O
N
N
E
C
T
IC
U
T
16
.9
7
36
N
E
W
Y
O
R
K
26
.2
6
10
D
E
LA
W
A
R
E
12
.7
6
37
N
O
R
T
H
C
A
R
O
LI
N
A
4.
26
11
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
O
F
C
O
LU
M
B
IA
14
.0
1
38
N
O
R
T
H
D
A
K
O
T
A
8.
66
12
F
LO
R
ID
A
7.
56
39
O
H
IO
16
.3
6
13
G
E
O
R
G
IA
6.
23
40
O
K
LA
H
O
M
A
8.
10
16
ID
A
H
O
7.
64
41
O
R
E
G
O
N
16
.7
0
17
IL
LI
N
O
IS
17
.7
3
42
P
E
N
N
SY
LV
A
N
IA
16
.1
4
18
IN
D
IA
N
A
13
.2
0
44
R
H
O
D
E
IS
LA
N
D
17
.4
3
19
IO
W
A
13
.7
3
45
SO
U
T
H
C
A
R
O
LI
N
A
5.
18
20
K
A
N
SA
S
9.
66
46
SO
U
T
H
D
A
K
O
T
A
7.
01
21
K
E
N
T
U
C
K
Y
11
.2
9
47
T
E
N
N
E
SS
E
E
7.
46
22
LO
U
IS
IA
N
A
7.
57
48
T
E
X
A
S
6.
45
23
M
A
IN
E
14
.1
0
49
U
T
A
H
7.
27
24
M
A
R
Y
LA
N
D
14
.6
8
50
V
E
R
M
O
N
T
12
.6
5
25
M
A
SS
A
C
H
U
SE
T
T
S
15
.6
8
51
V
IR
G
IN
IA
6.
13
26
M
IC
H
IG
A
N
20
.4
1
53
W
A
SH
IN
G
T
O
N
20
.5
6
27
M
IN
N
E
SO
T
A
17
.0
5
54
W
E
ST
V
IR
G
IN
IA
15
.1
0
28
M
IS
SI
SS
IP
P
I
7.
50
55
W
IS
C
O
N
SI
N
16
.0
0
29
M
IS
SO
U
R
I
12
.7
3
56
W
Y
O
M
IN
G
9.
39
30
M
O
N
T
A
N
A
14
.9
3
N
ot
es
:
So
ur
ce
-
B
ur
ea
u
of
La
bo
r
St
at
is
ti
cs
,a
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
ti
on
s
31
Table 7: States with Right to Work Laws
FIPS State State Name Statue Enactment Constitutional Amendment
1 ALABAMA 1953
4 ARIZONA 1947 1946
5 ARKANSAS 1947 1944
12 FLORIDA 1943 1968
13 GEORGIA 1947
16 IDAHO 1985
18 INDIANA 2012
19 IOWA 1947
20 KANSAS 1958
22 LOUISIANA 1976
26 MICHIGAN 2012
28 MISSISSIPPI 1954 1960
31 NEBRASKA 1947 1946
32 NEVADA 1951 1952
37 NORTH CAROLINA 1947
38 NORTH DAKOTA 1947 1948
40 OKLAHOMA 2001 2001
45 SOUTH CAROLINA 1954
46 SOUTH DAKOTA 1947 1946
47 TENNESSEE 1947
48 TEXAS 1993
49 UTAH 1955
51 VIRGINIA 1947
56 WYOMING 1963
Notes: Source- National Conference of State Legislatures
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Figure 1: Infinitely Elastic Labor Supply (Hamermesh, 1993)
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Figure 2: Total Industry Employment in Thousands
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Figure 3: Mean Industry Wage Rate for the United States
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Figure 4: Mean Industry Output for the United States
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